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This paper analyses the impact of aid flows on governance. Using an instrumental variable 
approach and a large country sample, we find that aid has a negative rather than a positive 
influence on governance. This outcome is robust to various model specifications.  
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1.  Introduction 
Numerous studies have shown that governance matters for economic and social development 
(World Bank 2005). Despite the overwhelming evidence, there is surprisingly little research 
on how to promote it effectively. Broadly defined, governance refers to the selection and 
monitoring of governments and the effectiveness of the government in implementing policies. 
In this paper, we examine one important aspect, namely the impact of official development 
assistance  (ODA)  on  governance.  From  a  theoretical  perspective,  aid  could  release 
governments from binding revenue constraints and enable them to concentrate on enforcing 
law and order or fighting corruption effectively. In addition, aid could provide developing 
countries  much  needed  technical  assistance  in  building  effective  institutions  to  improve 
governance. 
  On the other hand, due to moral hazard problems and rent seeking, high levels of aid 
could delay or block necessary domestic reforms to improve governance. Furthermore, high 
transaction  costs  that  accompany  aid  (on  the  side  of  the  receiving  country),  donor 
fragmentation  that  multiple  donor  projects  and  agendas  promote,  problems  of  “poaching” 
qualified (government) staff members for aid projects, and the potential negative effects on 
raising  taxes  could  all  result  in  a  deterioration  of  governance,  even  though  entirely 
unintended. Hence, the net impact of aid on governance is unclear at the outset.  
  To our knowledge, only two studies have addressed the impact of aid on governance 
so far. Bräutigam and Knack (2004) find that aid might be harmful for governance. Yet their 
results  are  based  on  a  purely  cross-sectional  analysis  for  the  period  1982  to  1997  and 
restricted  to  32  African  countries.  Rajan  and  Subramanian  (2007)  demonstrate  that  in 
countries  that  receive  more  aid,  governance-dependent  industries  grow  relatively  more 
slowly. Governance-dependent industries can primarily be found in manufacturing, as this 
sector requires complex transactions between contracting parties that rely on the rule of law or 
effective regulations. What is missing is a thorough empirical analysis of the direct impact of 
ODA on governance over time and across countries. This brief paper intends to fill that gap. 
 
2.  Variables and Methodology 
As  an  indicator  for  the  quality  of  governance,  we  use  three  sub-components  of  the 
International  Country  Risk  Guide  (ICRG),  namely,  corruption,  law  and  order,  and 
bureaucracy  quality.  All  three  are  clearly  linked  to  governance,  highly  relevant  for 
development issues, and scaled (or rescaled) from 0 to 6, where higher values indicate less 
corruption, better law and order enforcement, and higher bureaucracy quality. We compute a   3 
composite governance indicator (labelled Govcomp) by adding up the three sub-components 
to assess the overall quality of governance.  
  Apart from Aid, defined as ODA as a share of (host) GDP, we employ a considerable 
number of economic and political explanatory  variables.
1 We expect a positive impact of 
trade on governance, since open economies are more likely to learn from the experience in 
their trading partners’ countries. Moreover, rent seeking and corruption might be harder in 
more open economies, as foreign firms increase the number of economic agents involved 
(Rajan and Zingales 2003). Both press freedom and political constraints on the executive 
branch are likely to improve the accountability of the government, which leads to positive 
impact on governance, whereas we expect the opposite for (internal and external) conflicts as 
well as inflation and the black-market premium as proxies for macroeconomic distortions.  
  Higher educational attainment levels should promote governance, as a better educated 
population is more likely to participate in (public) decision making and to demand better 
governance.  The  same  applies  to  economic  growth,  which  could  provide  the  required 
financial resources for the enhancement of governance. Similar to trade, we also expect a 
positive influence of FDI on Govcomp, since foreign investors might lobby for improvements 
in governance. Finally, the sign for the population as a proxy for the country size is unclear a 
priori, as larger countries possess a critical financial mass to improve governance but – at the 
same time – face more information asymmetry problems and higher transaction costs, which 
could impede improvements in governance. 
  Our sample consists of 106 countries that have received (or repaid) ODA within the 
period  considered  and  for  which  we  obtained  data  for  Govcomp  and  the  independent 
variables.
2 Due to a lack of earlier data for Govcomp, our analysis covers the period 1984 to 
2004. To reduce large variations in the data, we compute three-year averages of all variables, 
which leaves us with seven periods of three years. 
  Since all independent variables are endogenous (except, perhaps, the population), we 
apply the system-GMM (Generalised Method of Moments) estimator. This dynamic panel 
estimator, suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998), uses lagged levels and first differences as 
instruments for the endogenous variables and is based on two equations. The first equation, 
based on levels, reads as follows: 
it t it it it it i it X Aid Govcomp Govcomp Govcomp ε λ γ β β β α + + + + + + = − − '        ) 1 ( 3 2 2 1 1  
                                                 
1 See the Appendix for exact definitions of all variables and data sources. 
2 Importantly, our empirical results hardly change if we exclude negative aid flows.   4 
where Govcompit denotes the governance indicator for country i in period t, αi is the country 
fixed effect, Govcompit-1 and Govcompit-2 represent the lagged dependent variable in previous 
periods, Aidit is the variable of interest, Xit denotes the set of control variables, λt is a set of 
time  dummies,  and  εit  stands  for  the  error  term.  The  second  equation  is  based  on  first 
differences, which eliminates the country-specific effects: 
it t it it it it it X Aid Govcomp Govcomp Govcomp ε λ γ β β β ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − − '        ) 2 ( 3 2 2 1 1  
where  ∆Govcompit = Govcompit   - Govcompit-1.  In  fact,  we  are  estimating  both  equations 
simultaneously using several lags and differences as instruments.  
 
3.  Empirical Results and Policy Implications 
We now turn to the empirical results. To begin with, we use only openness to trade, press 
freedom, conflicts, and population as control variables and Aid as the variable of principal 
interest. The signs of the coefficients are largely as expected (see Model 1, that is, column 1 
in Table 1). Being more open to trade leads to an improvement in governance, whereas the 
opposite applies to conflicts. Both an enhanced press freedom and a larger population are 
positively associated with governance. An increase in aid, however, leads to a worsening of 
governance.
3 We then check the robustness of the results for Model 1 by reducing the number 
of lags used as instruments dramatically (Model 1 and column 2). The results regarding the 
variable of main interest (Aid) (and almost all of the other explanatory variables), however, do 
not change much.
4 
  Next, we add the remaining control variables one by one to the benchmark equation 
(Models 2 to 7), since  the inclusion of  a large number of control variables increases the 
number  of  instruments  enormously  in  the  system-GMM  estimation  and/or  the  number  of 
countries included in the analysis would decline. Yet we also report the results if all additional 
control variables are added simultaneously (Model 8),
5 though the results are less reliable in 
comparison to previous models, as we had to lower the number of lags dramatically. The 
signs of the further control variables are largely as expected, though not all coefficients are 
statistically significant at conventional threshold levels.  Importantly, Aid has in all model 
specification a negative sign and is significant at least at the 10 per cent level, but often at the 
                                                 
3 The regression diagnostics, reported at the bottom of Table 1, indicate that we have no second-order serial 
correlation in the residuals. We obtain this result by including the second lag of the dependent variable. The 
J-statistics of the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions suggest that the applied instruments are valid. 
4 We obtain a similar outcome for the following (extended) model specifications. 
5 We exclude, however, the black-market premium, as this variable is closely correlated with the inflation rate, 
but restricted to both fewer countries and periods.   5 
5 or even 1 per cent level. This means that Aid belongs to the small group of explanatory 
variables that is quite robust. 
  Apart from Model 7, which is not directly comparable to the other specifications, the 
estimated coefficients for Aid vary between 0.02 and 0.04. Taken at face value, this means 
that an increase in aid by the within standard deviation (4.43 percentage points of GNI) leads 
to a deterioration in Govcomp of some 0.09 to 0.18 points. Therefore, the impact of aid on 
governance is not very large, but it is always negative and quite robust to different model 
specifications. 
  It could be argued that Aid does not correctly measure the amount of development 
assistance  a  country  actually  receives.  ODA  comprises  various  forms  of  development 
assistance, including debt relief, which hardly counts as new aid. While we have to keep the 
limitations of using aggregate data in mind, we still think our aid measure is appropriate for 
the aid-governance nexus. Moreover, we run various robustness checks using different aid 
measures, such as effective development assistance (EDA). Yet the outcome is very similar.
6  
Even in view of our results, we do not suggest that governance could be improved by 
lowering aid flows. Still, the intended increase in aid over the next couple of  years – in 
particular  to  African  countries  –  should  be  viewed  with  great  caution.  Donors  should 
reconsider  current  aid  structures  and  aid  effectiveness  when  increasing  aid  flows. 
Correspondingly, recipient countries need to rethink carefully the potential drawbacks of aid 




                                                 
6 Results for various robustness checks that are not shown in the paper can be obtained from the first author upon 
request.   6 
Table 1: Aid and Governance 
  Dependent variable: Govcomp 
lags  (2 to 5)  (2 to 2)  (2 to 4)  (2 to 4)  (2 to 4)  (2 to 4)  (2 to 4)  (2 to 3)  (2 to 2) 
Independent variables  Model 1  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Govcomp (t-1)  
 








0.931***   
(20.1) 
0.902***   
(18.9) 
0.95***     
(21.5) 
0.846***   
(11.1) 
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-0.0001  
(-0.32)   
Observations  475  475  470  398  475  470  475  284  393 
Countries  106  106  105  89  106  105  106  87  88 
Sargan (p-value)
1  0.18  0.12  0.39  0.25  0.27  0.32  0.28  0.34  0.70 
AB 2 (p-value)
 2  0.99  0.93  0.98  0.34  0.98  0.88  0.61  0.39  0.65 
Instruments  96  51  102  84  102  102  102  77  96 
Notes: Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by  *,  **,  and  ***, respectively. Estimation based on one-step system-GMM estimator with robust standard errors; 
corresponding z-values are reported in parentheses. Constant terms and time dummies are always included but not reported. 
1 Sargan-test of overidentification. 
2 Arellano-Bond-test that 
second-order autocorrelation in residuals is 0; first-order autocorrelation is always rejected (not reported). 
   7 
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Appendix: Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Aid  Official development assistance in % of (host) GDP  OECD (2007) and 
World Bank (2007a) 
Black-Market 
Premium 
Black-market premium for foreign currency (US Dollar) in %  World Bank (2007b) 
Conflicts  Incidence and intensity of internal and external conflicts: 0 (no 
conflict), 1 (number of casualties in the range from 1 to 25), 2 (26 




Real growth of GDP per capita in %  World Bank (2007a) 
FDI  Foreign direct investment as a share of GDP  World Bank (2007a) 
Govcomp  ICRG composite governance indicator, including law & order, 
bureaucracy quality, and corruption, monthly data, 0-18 
PRS Group (2007) 
Literacy Rate  Literacy rate in %, population ages 15 and above  World Bank (2007a) 
Political 
Constraints 
Political constraints V, Henisz database, 0-1  Henisz (2007)  
Population  Total Population  World Bank (2007a) 
Press Freedom  Freedom of the press (0-2)  Freedom House 
(2007) 
Trade  Total imports and exports of goods divided by GDP in %  Heston, Summers and 
Aten (2006) 
 
 